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A review of a few input-output models indicates the importance of teacher ability, 
which may be independent of years of training, for improving pupil performance. 
A  historical  analysis  confirms  the  substantial  pay  increases  experienced  by 
teachers in the mid-1990s, moderate pay increases in real terms since 1996, and 
a falling ratio of teacher pay to GDP per capita. Analysis of Labour Force Survey 
data reveals that in 2007 teachers were paid less than other professionals, even if 
the comparison is made conditional on a number of non-pay variables. Working 
hours is not used as a conditioning variable, however, and low pupil performance 
levels suggest that the average productivity of teachers is not high. In 2007 the 
age-pay  slope  for  teachers  was  flatter  than  that  for  other  professionals.  The 
impact  of  the  2008  changes  to  the  teacher  pay  system  are  considered.  These 
changes  initiate  a  gradual  closing  of  the  pay  gap  between  teachers  and  other 
professionals, and convert a rather flat age-pay slope for teachers into one that 
compares favourably to that of other professionals, and to those of teachers in 
other  countries.  The  fact  that  the  new  system  links  progression  up  the  salary 
scales  to  the  behavioural  input  characteristics  of  teachers  is  line  with  good 
practice  elsewhere,  but  the  linking  of  pupil  performance  to  teacher  pay  is 
probably  best  undertaken  collectively  at  the  level  of  the  school.  The  teaching 
hours put in by teachers compares favourably to those in other countries, yet the 
utilisation of teacher time in many schools is not optimal, resulting in class sizes 
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1  Introduction and background 
In South Africa there are around 380,000 publicly paid educators whose pay is managed 
through a single pay system, a term we take to describe, mainly, pay scales and promotion 
rules, but even other conditions of service matters linked to the employment contract such as 
teacher deployment and working hours. The power to change this pay system rests largely 
with the national Minister of Education, though historically teacher unions play an important 
role  in  determining  any  changes  through  negotiations  in  the  Education  Labour  Relations 
Council  (ELRC).  No  pay  system  in  the  country  encompasses  as  many  employees  as  the 
educator one. The educator wage bill amounts to around 3.5% of GDP, and about 3.0% of 
economically  active  South  Africans  are  educators  (here  we  are  counting  only  publicly 
employed educators1F
2). However, the role that the country’s publicly employed educators play 
in the social and economic development of the country goes well beyond what these figures 
indicate and, as we shall see below, is often under-estimated. 
Here we shall follow the common practice of referring to the 365,000 educators who spend at 
least some time teaching in classrooms, as ‘teachers’. The remaining 15,000 educators are 
essentially engaged in managing the teachers2F
3. 
As background to the main focus of the paper it is useful to restate where South Africa stands 
with respect to the quantity of schooling, and its quality. The country has reached a stage at 
which  the  quality  challenges  in  the  schooling  system  clearly  overshadow  the  quantity 
challenges. In the past, enrolment ratios were not high. This explains why the average years of 
education of South African adults is relatively low – it stands at around 9.0 years, against for 
instance 10.0 and 10.8 years in the middle income countries Malaysia and Chile3F
4. However, at 
least as far as pre-tertiary enrolment levels are concerned, South Africa is well placed to close 
this gap with respect to adult education levels – for example, South Africa’s secondary level 
gross enrolment ratio (93.0) and primary to secondary school life expectancy statistic (12.1) 
are considerably better than those of both Malaysia (76.0 and 10.8) and Chile (91.0 and 11.7) 
and middle income countries in general4F
5. South Africa’s tertiary enrolment level, on the other 
hand, does not compare that well to those of other middle income countries, but as our focus 
is  on  educators  working  at  the  pre-tertiary  level,  this  important  matter  will  not  receive 
attention in the paper.  
Indicators  of  the  quality  of  education  at  the  pre-tertiary  level  point  very  clearly  towards 
serious problems. In both the 2003 TIMSS assessment (Grade 8 mathematics and science, 
with 21 of 45 countries being developing countries) and the 2006 PIRLS assessment (Grade 5 
reading, with 11 of 39 countries being developing countries), South Africa fared worst of all 
countries (though it should be kept in mind that countries participating in these international 
benchmarking exercises would tend to be countries that take education rather seriously). In 
the regional 2000 SACMEQ programme (Grade 6), South Africa came eighth and ninth out of 
fourteen countries for reading and mathematics respectively5F
6, this despite the fact that South 
                                                       
2 Around 550,000 people define themselves as educators of some type in Stats SA household surveys, 
which translates to 4.5% of workers.  
3 In splitting the total here, we have counted school principals who teach (an estimated 85% of all the 
25,000 principals) as teachers, meaning most of the 15,000 managers would be educators not base d in 
schools.  
4 Cohen and Soto (2001). 
5 UNESCO (2007).  
6 Mullis, Martin, Gonzalez and Chrostowski (2004); Mullis, Martin, Kennedy and Foy (2007); Van der 
Berg (2005).  4 
 
Africa’s per pupil6F
7 expenditure in schools in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms exceeds 
that of all the other thirteen countries except Seychelles7F
8.  
In the last decade, the improved availability of cross-country data on pupil performance of the 
TIMSS variety has allowed analysts to examine the links between educational quality and 
economic growth, and their conclusions underline very clearly the importance of quality, and 
the relatively unimportant role of quantity, a factor that had in earlier models (which lacked 
data  on  quality)  appeared  to  be  the  determining  factor.  This  is  not  to  say  quantity  is 
unimportant. Without enrolments in educational institutions, there can be little human capital 
development. However, any growth-oriented national strategy should focus primarily on what 
youths are learning, rather than on how many years they spend in school.  
A reluctance to focus on educational quality often stems from the assumption that educational 
quality is difficult to measure, or that improvements take a very long time. Arguably, both 
assumptions are incorrect. In recent years many examples have emerged of practical ways in 
which to measure educational quality in a variety of contexts. And with the right education 
interventions, change need not be slow. To take an example, the Philippines experienced an 
improvement in its  Grade 8 mathematics average score, as measured by rigorous TIMSS 
standards, of 10% between 1999 and 2003. The opportunities for relatively fast gains are 
greater when the baseline is low (as is the case in South Africa and the Philippines)8F
9.  
A further background question that often lurks behind the education policy debates is the 
question of whether South Africa’s relatively poor average educational performance is due to 
the very public nature of schooling in the country. Clearly, the publicness of the schooling 
system is not something that can be changed easily, yet the question is an important one. 
Whilst we do not aim to tackle this question in depth, it seems relevant for the rest of the 
paper to present the rough analysis captured in the next graph. South Africa (SA) undoubtedly 
has a highly public schooling system, though the country is by no means exceptional in this 
regard. Many countries with equally public systems perform well, and there is no statistically 
significant link between the publicness of schooling and pupil performance9F
10.  Whilst one 
cannot  rule  out  the  possibility  that  educational  quality  might  be  advanced  through  more 
private participation in schooling, there is no immediately evident reason to believe that the 
publicness  of  schooling  in  South  Africa,  including  the  publicly  managed  pay  system  for 
teachers, is in itself an obstacle to better quality.  
                                                       
7 The term ‘pupil’ is used in this paper instead of the conventional South African term ‘learner’ for the 
benefit of the non-South African reader. 
8 UNESCO (2007).  
9 Mullis, Martin, Gonzalez and Chrostowski (2004: 44). 
10 If one were to consider private secondary schools, as opposed to private primary schools, in Figure 1, 
the same picture  emerges. Unfortunately there are no internationally standardised statistics on the 
characteristics of the teacher pay system (for instance whether or not teacher pay is set nationally). 
Comparing such statistics to average learner performance would have b een more directly relevant to 
this analysis.    5 
 
Figure 1: Educational quality and degree of private schooling 
 
Source: Mullis, Martin, Gonzalez and Chrostowski (2004); UNESCO: UIS (2007).   
In this paper, we try as far as possible to make improving educational quality the point of 
departure in our discussion of how the teacher pay system works, and how it should evolve. 
This paper was produced immediately after what can be said to be the most thoroughgoing 
reform of the teacher pay system since the major changes of the mid-1990s brought about to 
create a new post-apartheid order. The recent changes are embodied in Resolution 1 of 2008 
of the Education Labour Relations Council (ELRC)10F
11 and bring about what is known as the 
Occupation Specific Dispensation (OSD). In fact, much of the analysis presented in this paper 
represents  a  slight  reworking  of  analysis  performed  within  the  Department  of  Education 
(DoE) in preparation for Resolution 1 (this is true for the pay analysis using Labour Force 
Survey data). Moreover, other Department of Education analysis (relating for instance to class 
size) is summarised below, though not presented in detail for reasons of space. Teacher pay 
(and related conditions of service matters) in South Africa is a widely discussed topic, but the 
quantitative and economic analysis of the topic is under-developed. Misunderstandings about 
key quantitative issues in the discourse are not uncommon. This explains the rather strong 
focus in the paper on clarifying the essential statistics as well as a few key concepts as they 
are  currently  understood  in  the  growing  international  literature  on  the  topic.  Detailed 
background statistics and some of the methodology have been relegated to the appendix.  
2  The teacher factors that matter for educational quality 
Numerous  attempts  have  been  made,  using  South  African  data,  to  identify  statistically 
significant schooling factors that contribute to educational quality, with a view to influencing 
policy. It is worth reminding ourselves what the available studies say about the impact of 
teachers, and teacher pay.  
Van der Berg and Burger (2003) arrive at a model with a statistically significant link between 
pupil performance (at the secondary level) and teacher pay, but attribute this link to years of 
post-secondary education and training of the teachers (more qualified teachers are paid more). 
Consistent with the international literature, there is no simple relationship between teacher 
pay  and  pupil  performance.  The  link  between  years  of  post-secondary  training  and 
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performance,  on  the  other  hand,  is  more  robust,  though  by  no  means  simple  or  beyond 
dispute. This matter is an important one as both the pre-2008 system and particularly the 2008 
OSD pay system have incentives for the upgrading of one’s qualifications. The distribution of 
years of post-secondary training amongst publicly employed educators gives a sense of the 
potential magnitude of the incentive effects:  
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Source: National Treasury (2007). 
 
Crouch and Mabogoane (1998) also draw a link between the years of post-secondary training 
and pupil performance in secondary schooling. Gustafsson (2007), focussing on the Grade 6 
level, finds that years of training effects are to a large degree actually the effects of which 
specific racially-defined apartheid training system teachers come from (only 12% of white 
teachers have fewer than four years of training, against 44% for African teachers). Generally 
data on training are simply a proxy for information on the teaching abilities of teachers, so 
one would expect to see a stronger link between teacher ability as reflected in a test or an 
evaluation, and pupil performance. The data have not permitted much analysis of this link in 
South Africa11F
12. Union pressure resulted in South Africa’s exclusion from the teacher testing 
element of the 2000 SACMEQ12F
13 study. Lee, Zuze and Ross (2005) find that where countries 
did test teachers, the SACMEQ 2000 data reveal a strong link. South Africa did test teachers 
in the 2007 SACMEQ run, and this obviously provides a valuable opportunity to examine 
these dynamics in the South African context. Of course it is not so much the finding that 
teacher ability influences pupil performance that is important for the policy process, but rather 
the detection of certain patterns within this finding,  for instance the relationship between 
teacher ability and years of training.  
Econometric analyses of school data typically find that reducing class sizes is not a feasible 
strategy for improving educational quality. The effects are simply too small, and the cost very 
large. Bhorat and Oosthuizen (2006), amongst others, reach this finding using South African 
data. Below, we argue that despite this finding, there is an argument for paying more attention 
to class size in South African policy than is currently the case.  
Some analysts point to a statistically significant link between pupil performance and certain 
behaviour traits amongst teachers, for instance arriving late at school 13F
14. Such findings are 
obviously important for the design of monitoring systems and teacher incentives.  
More qualitative studies of the schooling process have also yielded important findings, for 
instance that teachers require a curriculum and teaching materials that are sufficiently clear 
and effective in their design14F
15.  
                                                       
12 Crouch and Perry (2002) provides a rare exception.  
13 Southern and Eastern African Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality. 
14 See Gustafsson (2007).  7 
 
The mindset that informs the search for the right ‘ingredients’ in the teaching process is a 
fairly top-down one. Government and researchers need to identify what works, and ensure 
that  this  is  implemented.  To  some  extent  what  is  needed  is  the  right  mix  of  top-down 
strategies and strategies that recognise that the required solutions vary, depending on the 
schooling context, and the characteristics of individual teachers. With sufficient standardised 
assessment of pupils, and sufficient accountability and incentives mechanisms in place, it is 
possible to shift some of the responsibility for finding the right mix of ‘ingredients’ down to 
teachers themselves15F
16.  
Here we add one analysis to the current stock of statistical input-output analyses, using the 
2004 Systemic Evaluation dataset, which focuses on Grade 6. A summarised version of the 
results appears in the next table (for complete results see the Appendix). The analysis uses 
pupil  observations  from  the  80%  of  pupil-weighted  schools  with  the  lowest  average  test 
scores. Such sample reduction largely eliminates the problem of mixing schools with very 
different histories, and different education production dynamics, in one model, which can lead 
to results that are difficult to interpret. The values in the table represent the increase in pupil 
performance,  along  a  standardised  scale,  associated  with  an  increase  in  the  value  of  the 
explanatory variable from the 10
th to the 90
th percentile (within the sub-set of not-so-well-
performing schools). The standardised test score scale is calibrated to make the difference 
between  the  10
th  and  90
th  percentiles  for  all  observations,  including  those  from  better 
performing  schools,  equal  100.  To  take  an  example,  greater  confidence  on  the  part  of  a 
teacher in her pre-service training, equal to the difference between the 10
th and 90
th percentiles 
of this pre-service confidence variable in the sub-sample of schools, is associated with an 
improvement in the pupil’s reading score of 2.3 points along the standardised scale. 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 See for instance Schollar (2005).  
16 See Hoenack (1996: 329).  8 
 
Table 2: Determinants of pupil performance 




Teacher's years of education  E    0.63 
Teacher's professional confidence  E  2.28   
Teacher's participation in in-service training  E  1.05   
Teacher's access to the internet  E  15.10  6.86 
Teacher's prioritisation of salary relative to other factors  E  -0.98  -3.77 
Teacher's sense of society's appreciation  E  -2.16  -3.53 
Teacher's desire to stay in the profession  E  -2.01   
Average class size  P  -2.36  -2.29 
Teacher's use of an African language in class  E  -3.41   
Teacher's use of assignments (language)/projects (maths)  E    0.82 
Teacher's use of feedback (language)/examinations (maths)  E  -1.29  -1.15 
Teacher is female  E  2.95  2.80 
School fee charged  P  1.15  1.21 
Existence of a library  P  4.27  5.13 
Learner/toilet ratio  P  -2.91   
Existence of a computer  P  3.44  4.05 
Ability of learners to borrow library books  P    -2.94 
Existence of a telephone  P  6.56   
Existence of playground  P    2.81 
Learner's travelling time  L  -2.23   
Parent's level of education  H  6.67  5.39 
Availability of newspapers in the home  H  4.31  3.40 
Learner's socio-economic status  L  7.28  6.03 
Frequency of feeding scheme lunches  L  -9.53  -6.81 
Learner's nutritional status  L  3.50  1.72 
Educator and parent's home language is the same  EH    0.83 
Age difference learner to class average  L  -11.17  -7.71 
Educator and learner's gender is the same  EL  2.15  1.37 
Source: DoE (2007b). Note: Blank cells indicate that there was no statistically significant association 
between the variable and  the pupil test score. The letter symbols indicate the questionnaire that 
collected the data: E for educator, P for school principal, L for learner/pupil and H for home/parents. 
 
Certain results are noteworthy from the teacher policy perspective (there are obviously results 
relating to other policy areas that warrant discussion too, but we shall limit ourselves to the 
teacher policy issues here). Raising the years of education of the teacher from 15 to 16 years 
(or from 3 to 4 years of post-secondary training) is associated with a statistically significant 
impact when it comes to mathematics, but this impact (0.63) is relatively small compared to 
the impact of a number of other improvements. In fact, the model suggests that the teacher’s 
sense of professional confidence is a better predictor of better pupil performance than years of 
training, implying that targeting additional training towards those educators who feel they 
need more training could be more effective than targeting those educators with fewer years of 
training.  
The exceptionally large association between a teacher’s internet access and pupil performance 
is worth noting.  Of course this could be an indication that teachers who make sure they 
acquire  internet  access  are  the  kinds  of  teachers  who  produce  results  (as  opposed  to  an 
indication that the internet is a cause of better teaching). Nonetheless, it is not impossible that 
to  at least  some  degree,  access  to the internet  improves  a teacher’s  ability  to  teach.  The 
Minister of Education has in fact expressed a political commitment to public investments in 
laptops, with internet access, for professional and personal use by teachers.  
According to the model, where teachers prioritise pay (as opposed to other aspects of their 
working conditions), pupil performance is worse. There is an implication that rewarding good 
teachers means looking at incentives other than just salaries. Moreover, it is the teachers who 
are most keen on leaving the profession who perform best. This underlines the importance of 
identifying what incentives are effective at retaining good teachers, and ensuring that these 
are  in  place.  The  significance  of  the  teacher’s  gender  (and  the  relationship  between  the 
teacher’s gender and the learner’s gender) is very noteworthy. This is a complex matter, so the 9 
 
Systemic Evaluation on its own cannot explain the full dynamic. But the data do suggest that 
there are problems with male teachers (at least at the Grade 6 level).  
The  class  size  reduction  linked  to  the  improvement  in  pupil  performance  of  around  2.3 
standardised points (for both language and mathematics), is a reduction from 55 to 33 pupils. 
The impact of this change is comparable to, say, the impact of replacing a teacher who is not 
professionally  confident,  with  one  who  is.  This  model  does  then  indicate  that  there  are 
benefits  flowing  from  a  reduction  in  class  size.  Whether  this  change  is  feasible  will  be 
considered below.  
It is also noteworthy that certain variables were found not to be statistically significant as 
explainers of better pupil performance. Teacher age, which to a large degree correlates with 
years of experience, does not appear to matter. This is in keeping with findings from other 
schooling systems, and is a matter that receives further attention below. Contact time was also 
not found to be significantly linked to pupil performance. Three different levels of contact 
time are reported by the school principal, and all three values appear in a large number of 
schools, so it is unlikely that the insignificance of this variable is due to inadequate variety in 
the responses. 
3  Historical trends 
If  one  focuses  only  on  the  system-wide  statistics,  and  ignores  for  a  moment  the  major 
distributional changes that have occurred within the system, then there have been two major 
shifts over the last twenty years. The one was a steady increase in the number of teachers in 
the ten years preceding 1998. The other was a sharp increase in the salaries of teachers in the 
mid-1990s.  
Figure 2 illustrates the first shift. Between 1987 and 1997 the number of publicly employed 
teachers in schools increased by around 100,000. This increase was a response to enrolment 
increases – the pupil/teacher (P/T) ratio in schools during this period remained fairly constant 
at  between  32  and  34.  From  1998  onwards  there  was  a  slight  decline  in  the  number  of 
publicly employed teachers, largely as a result of a rationalisation process that saw a large 
number  of  publicly  employed  teachers  in  middle  class  schools,  which  had  enjoyed  a 
favourable staffing situation, find private employment within those same public schools (this 
employment practice became permitted in the early 1990s). Today, there are around 25,000 
privately employed teachers in public schools. Their presence lowers the pupil/teacher ratio 
average reported in Figure 2 by about 2.0, and would make the slight increase in the ratio over 
the twenty years seen in the graph a slight decrease. 
The national averages for the P/T ratio hide a substantial redistribution between schools, in 
favour  of  historically  disadvantaged  schools,  since  1994.  Despite  the  fact  that  privately 
employed teachers give middle class schools a P/T ratio advantage currently, the overall trend 
over the last decade has been towards lower P/T ratios for historically black schools at the 
cost  of  higher  P/T  ratios  for  historically  white  schools  (even  when  privately  employed 
teachers are counted)16F
17.  
The  average  annual  growth  in  the  number  of  all  publicly  employed  educators  (including 
educators not in schools), and in the number of workers in the country defining themselves as 
educators of some kind (according to Stats SA household surveys), was around 0.9% in the 
post-1999 period. This is lower than the annual population growth rate of around 1.3% in this 
period, and is indicative of problems in attracting a sufficient number of youths into teaching, 
and an ageing educator workforce affected by HIV/AIDS.  
                                                       
17 See Gustafsson and Patel (2006) for a discussion of the related shifts in public spending.  10 
 
Figure 2: Number of educators 1987-2007 
 
Source: South African Institute of Race Relations (1997); Research Institute for Education Planning 
(2005); Department of Education (1996); National Treasury (2007); Statistics South Africa (2008); 
Department of Education (2007a); 1985 to 1997 enrolment data sourced by Luis Crouch. Note: Values 
used for this and the next graph are provided in the Appendix. The pupil/teacher ratio here is the Public 
educators (schools) value divided into school enrolments.  
The  next  graph  illustrates  the  second  major  shift.  In  the  mid-1990s  the  salaries  of  most 
teachers rose dramatically – the real increase in the minimum pay notch for black teachers 
with  four  years  of  post-secondary  education  was  around  25%  (it  differed  by  ethnically-
defined  apartheid  education  department).  This  shift  was  due  to  a  post-apartheid  pay 
equalisation that essentially brought all teachers up to the favourable level enjoyed by the 
minority of white teachers in the past. Importantly, the rules still specified more pay for more 
qualified teachers, so the average black teacher still earned somewhat less than his white 
colleague  given  that  whites  had,  on  average,  more  years  of  post-secondary  training.  The 
unique historical circumstances of South Africa thus resulted in an abrupt and unusual lifting 
of the average unit cost of teachers to a substantially higher level. The alternative of lowering 
the  pay  of  white  teachers  was  regarded  as  politically  untenable,  and  clearly  the  unequal 
apartheid pay scales could not continue. The increase in the unit cost of teachers created 
important structural constraints for the public education system. In particular, it became much 
more difficult to lower the P/T ratio. To illustrate, lowering the P/T ratio from the current 33 
to 22 (more or less the level in Botswana) would raise annual spending on teacher salaries by 
R38bn, or by half the amount of public spending currently devoted to the health sector.  
Since  1998,  average  salary  spending  per  educator  has  increased  slightly  more  than  the 
minimum  pay  notch.  This  reflects  both  an  ageing  public  teacher  workforce,  and  some 
‘management  drift’,  or  an  increasing  proportion  of  educators  in  management  positions, 
including schools-based management positions such as Head of Department positions, which 
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Figure 3: Teacher pay 1989-2007 
 
Source: National Treasury (2007); National Treasury (2008); ELRC (2008); PSCBC (2004); Department 
of Education (2007); Pre-1996 pay notch data provided by Department of Education.    
Importantly, the ratio of average educator pay to GDP per capita has been declining. This is a 
trend one would expect in the country’s development trajectory17F
18, based on typical trends 
elsewhere. It is a trend that is comforting in the sense that it makes improvements such as a 
lowering of the P/T ratio over the longer term a possibility.  
4  The sufficiency of average teacher pay 
Given that teacher pay is determined through an administered process, and not through typical 
market  mechanisms,  determining  the  correctness  of  the  teacher  pay  level  becomes  an 
important  research  task.  Even  the  pay  of  privately  employed  educators  tends  to  follow 
patterns in the public service, making the detection of a market-related wage amongst these 
educators difficult. Researching what represents a sufficient level of teacher pay is complex, 
though a relatively good stock of literature on the subject has emerged elsewhere (very little 
analysis  for  South  Africa  has  occurred,  however).  Of  course  teacher  pay  is  not  just  an 
administrative determination of government, but also the outcome of interactions with teacher 
unions. This does not detract from the need for analysis, however, partly because research can  
assist in bringing issues related to teacher pay, such as working hours, pupil performance and 
teacher productivity to the fore within the bargaining process in a more empirical way.  
How does one determine the sufficiency of teacher pay? (Here we consider average teacher 
pay, and in some instances the pay of teachers after fifteen years of service. In the next section 
we look at how pay should vary by years of experience.) Economists typically calculate a 
‘conditional wage differential’  between teachers and other workers in the national labour 
market,  using  household  survey  data.  Differences  are  typically  conditional  on  years  of 
education, years of experience, working hours and gender. In South Africa clearly race would 
need to be considered, given both race-based discrimination in the labour market and strong 
correlations  between  quality  of  education  received  and  race  given  how  recently  racial 
discrimination in public schooling ended. Studies focussing on several countries and using a 
                                                       










































































































































Minimum pay notch Average total pay Teacher pay over GDP/cap.12 
 
uniform methodology have found that in certain countries teachers are overpaid, whilst in 
others  they  are  underpaid,  on  the  basis  of  a  conditional  comparison  of  pay  within  each 
country18F
19. This should not surprise us, as wage negotiation processes, and a government’s 
approach to teacher pay, would tend to be very country-specific.  
Conditional differences  in  earnings  can  be  explained  as follows.  If  gender  discrimination 
results in women earning less in the labour market, and if teaching has a larger proportion of 
women  than,  say,  other  professional  occupations  (which  is  usually  the  case),  then  lower 
wages for teachers could partly be the result of gender discrimination, and partly the result of 
an under-valuation of teachers by society. The conditional wage differential will separate 
different effects out and will tell us how strong the under-valuation of teachers effect on its 
own is.  
Of course even unconditional wage differentials must be understood and analysed, as this is 
what  people  perceive,  and  it  is  important  to  check  the  degree  to  which  perceptions  are 
supported by the data. Lastly, cross-country comparisons of the purchasing power of teachers 
can be instructive, and have been used in South Africa to argue that teachers are over-paid. 
However, as we shall see below, comparing teacher pay in different countries in isolation 
from other factors can be deceptive.  
In order to estimate conditional wage differentials between teachers and other occupations in 
South Africa, we combined four Labour Force Survey (LFS) datasets from 2006 and 2007, 
and adjusted all pay data to 2007 prices using the official CPIX. The datasets were combined 
to allow for the estimation of more reliable statistics. Around 67% of workers in the LFS data 
have exact earnings values, whilst a further 22% have earnings values in bins, and 10% have 
no earnings data at all (the percentages would be 52%, 38% and 10% if one considered only 
professionals  and  associate  professionals).  It  has  been  demonstrated  that  workers  with 
earnings data in bins tend to be different from workers with exact earnings data, and hence to 
improve the reliability of the study we estimated exact earnings values for each worker with a 
bin response, using an OLS imputation methodology, in line with the advice provided by 
Posel and Casale (2005). As a result, we obtained a dataset with exact earnings values for 
90% of all workers. In the Appendix, we report results using observations from this 90% of 
workers but also for the 67% who had original exact earnings values, partly to confirm the 
fact that one obtains different results (we regarded the 90% approach as the best approach). 
Moreover, in identifying professionals we followed an approach of using just the occupation 
variable, and a second approach of using the occupation variable plus the constraint that the 
worker had to have some post-secondary education. We considered the results of the second 
approach to be preferable, given that the policy discourse nearly always focuses, implicitly if 
not  explicitly,  on  the  difference  between  the  pay  of  teachers,  and  the  pay  of  other 
professionals with post-secondary education.  
We begin with the unconditional differences. Table 3 below indicates that in an unconditional 
comparison, teachers earn less than other professionals, however one defines this. One should 
keep in mind that the table reflects the situation before the 2008 OSD reform.  
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Teachers  1.00  1.00 
Non-teacher educators  1.31  0.87 
Educators (both of the above)  1.04  0.95 
Professionals*  2.46  1.81 
Technicians and associate professionals*  1.75  1.48 
Both of the above*  2.10  1.64 
All workers*  0.60  0.49 
Source: Stats SA, 2008 (March and September surveys for 2006 and 
2007 used). The unconditional values are taken from Table 6 in the 
Appendix, whilst the conditional values come from Table 7 in the 
Appendix. What seemed the best estimates from those tables were 
chosen. Note: * means educators excluded. 
 
The  distinction  made  in  the  LFS  between  professionals  and  ‘technicians  and  associate 
professionals’ requires some discussion. Of the around 500,000 educators in the LFS data (see 
Figure  2),  some  380,000  to  450,000  (the  number  depends  on  whether  one  uses  a  post-
secondary education requirement) are fairly clearly marked as primary or secondary school 
teachers. This corresponds fairly well to what one would expect, namely 420,000 teachers, 
being around 365,000 public employees in schools, 25,000 privately employed teachers in 
public schools, 20,000 teachers in independent schools and 7,000 mostly public employees in 
special schools. Around 70% of the teachers in the LFS are classified as ‘technicians and 
associate professionals’ (TAP), whilst 30% are professionals. This distinction is difficult to 
interpret. To some extent it follows years of education and pay, but not very systematically. 
The  situation  seems  to  warrant  a  comparison  against  both  the  professional  and  TAP 
categories.  
The  next  graph  provides  an  unconditional  comparison  of  pay  across  several  prominent 
occupation categories in the LFS (within the professional and TAP super-categories). It is 
clear that teachers (and even non-teacher educators) find themselves within a lower tier of 
professionals,  with doctors,  lawyers,  accountants and consultants occupying a  higher tier. 
This pattern is important, because the apparent pay disadvantage of teachers then translates 
into the question of whether teachers should move into the higher tier of professionals, or are 
more like lower tier professionals such as social workers and nurses.  14 
 
Figure 4: Annual pay by occupation 
 
Source:  Stats  SA  (2008)  (March  and  September  surveys  for  2006  and  2007  used).  Note:  Bars 
represents the range from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile. Observations analysed include those where 
bins were converted to exact values, and include only those where there was some post-secondary 
education.  
What the previous graph makes clear is that earnings reported in the LFS are under-reported. 
A comparison with Figure 3 suggests that the under-reporting is as high as 50%. Such under-
reporting  for  earnings  is  common  in  LFS-type  surveys  around  the  world,  partly  because 
respondents  do  not  report  gross  earnings,  but  rather  earnings  after  tax,  and  often  after 
deductions for benefits. (Respondents in the LFS are asked what their gross pay is.) 
Turning to a conditional wage comparison, we used years of education, years of experience, 
gender and race as conditioning variables. We did not use working hours due to the absence 
of suitable data on this in the LFS and elsewhere. Table 3 summarises the results (details 
appear in Table 7 in the Appendix). This analysis narrows the pay gap between teachers and 
other professionals, for instance the difference ratio with respect to professionals (plus TAP) 
drops from 2.1 to 1.6 (when compared to the unconditional analysis). The coefficients from 
the detailed results indicate that race is an important factor explaining wage in the South 
African labour market. As several analysts have argued, to a large degree the importance of 
race is linked to apartheid-era education experiences. The inconsistency in the results for non-
teacher educators probably has little policy significance. These educators constitute a very 
diverse and small sub-group of educators, and the inconsistencies appear to be a result of the 
use of the log-lin model.  
The conditional pay differences suggest that teachers were in fact under-paid in 2007. Though 
we have not considered working hours, it seems unlikely that this factor would take, for 




































































































































































































































































One factor that is not typically included in an estimation of conditional wage differentials is 
outputs,  or  worker  productivity.  Given  the  nature  of  public  schooling,  it  is  possible  for 
productivity to decline to very low levels without major institutional repercussions. Public 
schools that are unproductive generally do not lose clients and go bankrupt in the way that 
private schools or a private law firm may. We could not find any model that could compare 
pay levels across occupations conditional on outputs produced, and one presumes that such a 
model would be virtually impossible to design. Yet, even if it is in an informal way, school 
outputs,  which  we  know  are  low  in  South  Africa,  need  to  be  at  least  a  background 
consideration when teacher pay is discussed. We elaborate on this below. 
The  2008  salary  agreement  provided an immediate  increase for  teachers  in real terms  of 
around 5%, and promises of substantial future increases, in particular for better performing 
teachers.  All  teachers  who  perform  at  least  at  a  ‘satisfactory’  level,  according  to  an 
assessment panel within the school, will receive a 3% salary scale progression every second 
year over and above the regular inflationary increases. Teachers who are deemed to perform 
at  a  ‘good’  or  ‘outstanding’  level,  according  to  an  assessment  process  that  involves 
moderation by the district office, will receive, in addition, an increase of 3% or 6% every 
second year. The assessment currently focuses on behavioural input factors such as ability to 
prepare  classes,  and  conduct  pupil  assessments,  but  the  2008  agreement  includes  an  in 
principle  acceptance  by  unions  and  the  employer  that  in  future  years  pupil  performance 
should be brought to bear on the assessment of the teacher. Challenges in this regard are 
discussed in section 6 below. Predicting what a teacher will earn, say, fifteen years into her 
career, obviously requires an assumption about the teacher’s level of performance. This could 
be ‘satisfactory’ in one cycle, then ‘good’ in the next cycle, then ‘satisfactory’, and so on.  
Figure 5 allows us to look at several different unconditional pay comparisons simultaneously. 
The graph is not a perfect reflection of the various pay levels, partly because sources vary in 
their reliability and methodology, and because purchasing power parity (PPP) comparisons 
are inherently prone to inaccuracies. However, the graph provides a sufficient schema for an 
overall view of various possible comparisons. Pay is gross pay, and as far as possible teacher 
pay is pay of teachers after 15 years. 
Figure 5: Comparisons across countries and occupations 
 
Sources: National Treasury (2007) (for South Africa); Hernani-Limarino (2005: 79); Mizala and 
Romaguera (2005: 111-112); Gould, Abraham and Bailey (2005: 5-7). Note: Teacher pay estimates 



























































the US, Australia, Germany and France. Latin American countries considered are Argentina, Brazil, 
Uruguay, Chile, Peru and Mexico. The relationship between GDP per capita and pay in the case of Latin 
America, in particular the fact that GDP per capita appears higher than the average pay of non-teachers, 
begs questioning. The explanation seems to lie in a particularly prominent under-reporting of income in 
household surveys, in particular amongst the rich.     
The purchasing power of South Africa’s primary and secondary school teachers is relatively 
high. It is not far from the level found in rich countries, and it is well above the Latin America 
middle income country level. And if one examines the relationship between teacher pay and 
GDP per capita, then the level in South Africa is well above what is seen in Latin America 
and  rich  countries.  Teacher  pay  in  South  Africa  is  undoubtedly  high  by  international 
standards if one considers the country’s level of development. This has given rise to concerns 
in the teacher pay debates. However, as the graph shows, all professionals, whether teachers 
or non-teachers, enjoy an exceptionally high purchasing power in South Africa (relative to the 
country’s level of development), so insofar as this is a problem, it is a problem that relates to 
all  professionals.  Despite  the  large  teacher  pay  increases  in  the  mid-1990s,  teacher  pay 
remained below the pay of other professionals. It is not within the scope of this paper to 
explain why professionals are paid what they are in South Africa, but undoubtedly this is 
linked to the country’s acute skills shortage and high level of structural unemployment.  
South  Africa  is  not  alone  amongst  developing  countries  in  having  high teacher  pay.  The 
Philippines  and  Malaysia  have  ratios  of  teacher  pay  to  GDP  per  capita  of  3.8  and  2.7 
respectively19F
20.  But  teacher  pay  in  South  Africa  is  undeniably  above  the  middle  income 
country norm.  
What is also illustrated in the above graph is the virtual equality of teacher pay across the 
primary  and  secondary  school  levels  in  South  Africa.  Again,  this  is  unusual  amongst 
developing countries, and probably exacerbates the upward pressure on teacher pay as, in a 
sense, primary school teachers are able to ‘free ride’ on the need to raise the pay of secondary 
school teachers, in particular those who have specialised in subjects for which there is a high 
demand in the labour market. One can speculate that the reason why South Africa has not 
drawn a strong distinction between primary and secondary school teachers in its policy is that 
until recently there was such a strong emphasis on racial and ethnic differentiation, that there 
simply was no room to also draw distinctions according to the level of schooling. If primary 
school teachers are relatively advantaged by the system, the policy implication is perhaps that 
this provides the state with additional persuasive power to demand quality improvements at 
the primary schooling level, where it is known much of the educational quality problem lies.  
The  future  teacher  pay  level  for  South  Africa  in  Figure  5  assumes  just  ‘satisfactory’ 
performance for a period of 15 years, and will narrow but not close the unconditional pay gap 
between teachers and other professionals. The PPP earnings of teachers 15 years into the 
future will thus be at least as high as those of teachers in rich countries (they could be higher 
if the teacher’s performance exceeds satisfactory). Obviously this comparison is somewhat 
crude partly because it does not take into account the publicly funded social benefits which, 
relative to tax paid, would be higher in rich countries. Nonetheless, the level of teacher pay in 
future years as put forward by the 2008 resolution clearly removes teacher pay as a factor that 
could  inhibit  quality  improvements,  and  should  clear  the  way  for  stronger  collaboration 
between  teachers,  their  unions,  the  state,  and  parent  communities  in  tackling  poor 
performance in schools.  
5  The relationship between experience and teacher pay 
One of the most important design elements of a teacher pay system is the relationship between 
years of experience and pay. By nature, schooling is an activity requiring many educated 
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workers engaged in the same activity, teaching, their whole working lives. It is inherently 
difficult  to  create  the  promotion  opportunities  that  workers  enjoy  in  many  other  sectors. 
Moreover, there is ample evidence that the productivity of teachers, whilst it may increase 
during the first four or so years, does not increase substantially thereafter. The rationale and 
opportunities for ongoing salary increases throughout one’s career are therefore much weaker 
in schooling than they are in other sectors. Yet such increases are needed if the schooling 
system is to retain teachers. How to specify these increases in the pay system is a key policy 
question. In virtually all countries, the teacher pay system does include experience-linked pay 
increments,  though  mostly  the  age-pay  curve  for  teachers  is  flatter  than  that  for  other 
professionals20F
21.  
The Labour Force Survey data were used to gauge the age-pay curve for teachers and other 
professionals. Figure 6 below provides unconditional curves. For teachers, the lifetime salary 
growth ratio, where we understand this to be career-end pay over career-start pay, is 1.58 (we 
assumed a career spanning ages 25 to 60). This does not seem to be a particularly flat curve, 
but as we shall see below, it is likely that the LFS exaggerates the slope of the teacher curve. 
What is clear from the graph is that other professionals, however we define them, enjoy a 
steeper  curve  up  to  around  age  50.  Thereafter  these  non-teachers  experience  diminishing 
returns to years of experience, something that is commonly observed in age-pay profiles. 
Teachers do not experience this same diminishing returns phenomenon, largely because their 
pay system is designed by government, and not determined by the market. The conditional 
version of the curves in Figure 6 follow similar patterns to the unconditional curves, though 
the gaps between the curves are reduced (see Figure 12 in the Appendix). We can therefore 
conclude on the basis of both the unconditional and conditional age-pay profiles that the pay 
disadvantage for teachers is greater for older teachers (say those between 40 and 50) than for 
younger  teachers.  Crouch  (2001),  using  a  conditional  comparison  of  the  pay  of  teachers 
against  the  pay  of  all  non-teachers  (not  just  professionals)  also  finds  that  older  teachers 
experience the greatest pay disadvantage, though he finds that younger teachers experience a 
pay  advantage  relative  to  non-teachers.  This  could  be  because  Crouch  looks  at  all  non-
teachers, but it could also be because his analysis uses much earlier data, namely household 
data from 1999.  
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Figure 6: Distribution of income values by age 
 
Source: Stats SA (2008) (March and September surveys for 2006 and 2007 used for the graph). Note: * 
means educators excluded. Only observations where workers had some post-secondary education were 
considered. Curves are derived using the Lowess smoothing method.  
 
The following graph examines age-pay profiles, but using Persal payroll data and official pay 
scales  from  the  previous  and  the  new  systems.  Managers  in  this  graph  are  Heads  of 
Department, Deputy Principals and Principals, and teachers are all remaining educators with 
at least four years of post-secondary training (the definition of teachers is thus narrower than 
what was used above). The payroll data indicate that the lifetime  salary growth ratio for 
teachers is 1.26 (it would be less if teachers with less than four years of training were also 
counted). For managers the figure obtained from the payroll data is 1.50. It seems as if the 
slope for teachers of 1.58 using household data is an exaggeration. It is possible that older 
teachers have a better idea of what their gross salaries are. The payroll data used for the graph 

















































Figure 7: Old and new salary scales 
 
Source: Department of Education (2007); National Treasury (2007); ELRC (2008). Note: The actual 
curve  for  teachers  excludes  the  approximately  45%  of  teachers  with  less  than  four  years  of 
qualifications. If these teachers are added, the curve drops by around R20,000 in the 25 to 35 age 
range, and less than this above age 35.  
What  is  noteworthy  is  that  the  pre-2008  pay  system  reflected  better  returns  to  years  of 
experience than did the payroll data on actual gross pay. For instance, the official system in 
2007 indicated that the lifetime salary growth ratio of a teacher should be 1.44, whilst the 
payroll data suggested it was only 1.26. This disparity can be explained by the fact that the 
pre-2008 system had not existed long enough to take full effect. After some years, the 1.44 
ratio  would  have  been  realised  in  the  payroll  data.  This  highlights  an  important  matter, 
namely that there is often a difference between the official and the apparent lifetime salary 
increase,  where  the  apparent  increase  is  what  the  patterns  amongst  current  wage  earners 
would suggest. What youths considering the possibility of a teaching career should focus on is 
the official lifetime increase. However, unless this is clearly communicated to them, it is 
possible that they will base their forecast (and hence their decision on whether to enter the 
profession) on the apparent increase. Clearly, it is important for the employer to actively 
signal to youths what the official scales are, in order to maximise the incentive effects of 
future salary growth, and in order for the profession to attract the best candidates it can. 
Though pay is by no means the only factor prospective teachers consider, it is inefficient to 
keep information about future pay benefits from candidates.  
The 2008 pay system contains substantial future benefits for new teachers that should be 
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change much with the introduction of the new system in 2008. The new system is largely 
about future increases.) The curve ‘New system I (teachers)’ in Figure 7 illustrates what a 
teacher who performs at a ‘satisfactory’ level can expect to earn. If one compares this curve to 
the teacher curve for the previous system, then it is clear that a mid-career pay plateau in the 
old system has been replaced by continuous increases to the end of the teacher’s career. This 
improves the official lifetime salary growth ratio from 1.44 to 1.69. However, a teacher who 
performs above a ‘satisfactory’ level can expect better increases. For example, a teacher who 
repeats  eight-year  cycles  of  satisfactory-good-good-outstanding  performance  (there  is  an 
assessment  every  second year)  can expect the  age-pay  curve  ‘New  system  II  (teachers)’, 
which  yields  a  lifetime  salary  growth  ratio  of  2.24,  or  an  age-pay  slope  that  is  easily 
comparable to that of non-teacher professionals.  
The 2008 system improves the pay prospects for managers too, but only if they perform above 
a ‘satisfactory’ level. A manager following a satisfactory-good-good-outstanding pattern can 
expect a lifetime salary growth ratio of 2.59.      
Figure 8 below indicates how South Africa’s previous and new official age-pay curves for 
teachers compare to those of other countries. The country has in fact moved from having one 
of the flattest curves, to having one of the steepest curves. These future benefits should be 
clearly communicated to youths to promote the recruitment of the best possible candidates, 
and should be used as a basis for demanding substantial educational quality improvements 
from the entire schooling system. (For teachers already in the schooling system, the new pay 
system  provides  performance-linked  increases  every  two  years  in  line  with  what  was 
explained above. However, teachers already in the system will not be able to attain the same 
lifetime increases as teachers who enter the system now.) 21 
 
Figure 8: Cross-country PPP comparison of teacher pay 
 
Source: Mizala and Romaguera (2005); DoE (2007); ELRC (2008); UNDP (2006); US CPI figures at 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/.  
 
6  Financial performance incentives for teachers 
There has been some discussion above of the financial performance incentives introduced 
with the 2008 OSD agreement. Here we look at the matter of such incentives in the light of 
some theory and international practice21F
22.  
Paying teachers more on an individual basis for good performance, either in the form of cash 
bonuses or (as in South Africa following 2008) through an elevation on the pay scales, is 
something that has been tried in very few developing countries, and is even rare in developed 
countries. Promotions into senior teaching positions are common (including in South Africa), 
but this differs from the OSD-type performance-linked salary progression largely because a 
promotions  system  includes  an  important  rationing  element.  If  teachers  compete,  by  out-
performing others, for promotion posts, there is a clear sense that the number of such posts is 
limited. However, in the system introduced in South Africa in 2008, the limitation lies not in 
the number of promotion posts, but in the definition of, for instance, ‘good’ and ‘outstanding’. 
Any teacher who fulfils the criteria of, say, a ‘good’ teacher can expect to move up the pay 
scales  by  the  specified  number  of  notches.  Undoubtedly,  in  the  planning  and  budgeting 
process, there must be some background rationing, which will to a large extent manifest itself 
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in the definitions of the performance levels. However, even with this background rationing, a 
system  of  performance-linked  pay  increments  introduces  less  predictability,  but  also  less 
entitlement, into the pay system. For instance, a school with no ‘good’ teachers will not see 
any  teachers  enjoying  the  associated  salary  growth.  Certainly  in  the  developing  country 
context, South Africa is breaking new ground with its 2008 policy on teacher performance 
incentives. 
A key policy design question in coming years will be how pupil performance should feature 
within the teacher incentives policies. The 2008 agreement links progression up the salary 
scales to input factors such as the teacher’s ability to plan her lessons, but it also includes an 
in principle agreement that somehow pupil performance should influence pay in the future. 
Though linking pupil performance to pay may seem intuitively sensible, experience across the 
world  suggests  that  one  should  proceed  with  considerable  caution.  Pupil  performance  is 
highly dependent on home background factors, in particular the socio-economic status of the 
pupil. Hence any teacher incentives attached to pupil performance need to control for home 
background factors, or one could simply end up rewarding those teachers whose pupils have 
the most favourable background factors. Even if one rewards teachers for improvements in 
pupil  performance  (as  opposed  to  absolute  levels  of  performance),  the  potential  for 
improvement  is  linked  to  background  factors.  Controlling  for  these  factors  can  be 
methodologically  challenging.  Moreover,  because  schooling  is  largely  a  team  effort,  it  is 
difficult, and potentially divisive, to attribute pupil performance to individual teachers in a 
school. Lastly, there is evidence that financial incentives for individual teachers linked to 
pupil performance can make a difference when the incentive is introduced, but that the effect 
is not lasting22F
23. 
The  literature  suggests  that  pay  incentives  for  all  teachers  within  a  school,  based  on 
improvements  in  the  average  pupil  results,  is  certainly  implementable  without  serious 
problems, and may cause the desired improvements. Amongst developing countries, the most 
widely  written  about  programme  of  this  type  is  the  SNED  programme  in  Chile.  In  this 
programme, the need to control for socio-economic status (SES) is dealt with by dividing 
schools into groups according to the average SES of pupils, and letting schools compete 
within their groups.  
A  key  challenge  in  any  educational  incentives  programme  is  to  study  the  impact  of  the 
incentives on educational outcomes to ensure that spending on the programme is justified, and 
that the programme is optimally designed. Where an incentive programme spans the entire 
schooling  system  (as  the  OSD  one  does),  it  is  notoriously  difficult  to  separate  out  the 
improvement  effects  of  the  programme  from  the  effects  of  other  factors.  However,  the 
literature  does  provide  some  suggestions  on  how  to  proceed.  Even  more  important  than 
programme-specific  impact  assessments,  however,  is  ongoing  monitoring  of  pupil 
performance to inform the policy debates and the relationship between the public employer 
and unions. If there are not substantial improvements in standardised scores collected through 
programmes such as the Systemic Evaluation in coming years, then one can be highly certain 
that the OSD is not working as it should.  
7  Working hours of teachers 
Though we did not use working hours in estimating conditional wage differences above, a 
short discussion of the teaching time of teachers is presented here, partly with a view to re-
examining the rather polemical numbers, and partly with a view to suggesting what research 
and policy work may be needed.  
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The required working hours of teachers can be regarded as an element of the teacher pay 
system, in the broad sense of this system used in this paper. What is very clear is that the 
formal school day is seven hours long, giving a 35 hour ‘formal’ working week. This is the 
time educators are required to be at school23F
24.  
What is less widely accepted is what teaching time of teachers should be. The policy states 
that in the case of primary school teachers 85% to 92% of the formal school day should go 
towards teaching. This works out to 30 to 32 hours per week – as we shall see below, this is a 
relatively ambitious target by international standards. The values are virtually the same for 
secondary school teachers. Crucially, these 30 to 32 hours exceed the ‘learner contact time’ 
specified in the curriculum for all grades – the highest learner contact time is 27.5 hours, at 
the senior secondary level. This means, for instance, that if you have eight classes in a school, 
you need just eight teachers. Of course this may not hold true in all situations, for instance in 
small  secondary  schools,  where  the  need  for  subject  teaching  can  result  in  timetabling 
problems which would necessitate more than eight teachers for eight classes. But certainly in 
primary schools, and even in large secondary schools, the one teacher per class criterion 
should hold in theory.  
In practice, however, schools mostly understand the requirement for teaching time to be lower 
than what the policy specifies. The amount of teaching time that is put in per teacher is partly 
a function of how the school understands the policy, and how successfully it implements this. 
A variety of factors such as illness, leave and discipline problems (such as latecoming) can 
affect implementation. An ELRC study24F
25 of teacher workload published in 2005 concluded 
that  on  average  educators  spent  3.2  hours  per  day  teaching.  This  average  included  the 
teaching time of managers based in schools. If we take into account only teachers, then this 
figure becomes 3.6 hours a day, or around 18 hours a week, which is well short of the 30 to 
32 hours referred to in the policy.  
A  cross-country  comparison  is  instructive.  The  next  graph,  based  on  2003  TIMSS  data 
focussing on teachers who teach Grade 8 mathematics, indicates that the average teaching 
time in South Africa was 17.6 hours per week. This is not far from the estimate of 18 hours 
derived  from  the  ELRC  report.  But  what  is  interesting  is  that  though  the  ELRC  report 
(commissioned  jointly  by  the  employer  and  unions)  describes  the  gap  between  required 
teaching time and actual teaching time as a problem, the TIMSS comparison suggests South 
Africa is doing fairly well (especially if one compares South Africa to the other developing 
countries in the graph). Clearly, the conclusion depends on the comparison being made.  
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Figure 9: International comparison of teaching hours (Grade 8) 
 
Source: IEA (2004). 
SACMEQ data, used for the next graph, provides a similar picture of an above average level 
of teaching time.  
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Figure 10: International comparison of teaching hours (Grade 8) 
 
Source: IIEP: SACMEQ (2004). 
It seems difficult to conclude that low teaching time is a major contributor to poor pupil 
performance  (South  Africa  fared  worst  of  all  the  TIMSS  countries  in  2003).  Production 
function analyses have not strongly pointed towards a problem with teacher-pupil contact 
time (in our 2004 Systemic Evaluation model, the contact hours variable was excluded due to 
low  significance  –  see  Table  4).  However,  it  is  possible  that  this  matter  has  not  been 
sufficiently  studied.  There  is  much  anecdotal,  and  some  empirical  evidence,  of  teacher 
latecoming being a problem. Teacher responses in the international questionnaires may not be 
a true reflection of time actually spent teaching.  
There is clearly a need for some policy work on teaching time. The Department of Education 
is currently reviewing teaching time requirements as part of the redesigning of the teacher 
post allocation model. The current policy requirements for teaching time are very ambitious. 
If  fully  complied  with,  they  would  put  South  Africa  far  above  any  other  country  in  the 
previous two graphs. Overly demanding policies, it is known, are likely to be ignored. At the 
same time, the high cost of teachers in South Africa relative to GDP per capita and, linked to 
this, high pupil/teacher ratios, do make it necessary for above average teaching hours to be 
demanded  from  each  teacher.  The  question  is  what  requirement  would  be  reasonable, 
economically justifiable, and supportive of the curriculum.  
8  Class size 
Focussed research into the dynamics of class size, in South Africa and elsewhere, is not 
common, largely because evidence indicates that the benefits accrued from reducing class 
sizes are, at best, small, and because reducing class sizes is clearly very costly. Yet there is 
much  anecdotal reference to  the  problem  of  large  classes in  South  Africa.  Cross-country 
comparisons do suggest there is a problem in South Africa, partly because the average class 
size is high, but also, importantly (as this is easier to resolve), because there is so much 
inequality amongst pupils with respect to the class size they experience. 















Teacher hours per week per Grade 6 teacher26 
 
The following graph provides a cross-country comparison for Grade 8 mathematics (using 
2003 TIMSS data). The mean class size for South Africa is 44.7 pupils (this is the mean class 
size experienced by pupils, or the size of the average pupil-weighted class). 16% of pupils 
experience a class size over 1.25 times the mean, in other words a class size exceeding 55.9. 
Of the 16 countries represented in the graph (the focus was on representing, in particular, 
developing countries), three stand out as having exceptionally large classes: South Africa, 
Morocco and Philippines. The problem in South Africa (and in Morocco) is largely one of the 
distribution of teachers – in Philippines the problem is more one of a very high average, in 
other words not enough teachers in classrooms overall. To compare, in Botswana, no pupils 
were in classes greater than 45.  
Figure 11: International comparison of class size 
 
Source: IEA (2004). Note: A horizontal line appears at class size 40, partly because this is commonly 
regarded in South Africa as the ideal maximum.  
Data from national collections reveal similar information. For instance the 2004 Systemic 
Evaluation indicates that the mean class size experienced by Grade 6 pupils was 43.4, and that 
17% of pupils experienced a class size that was 1.25 times the mean (or 54.3).  
These statistics raise a number of questions. Firstly, how serious is the problem if our point of 
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that the allocation of educator posts across schools is determined by a highly equitable model, 
the so-called ‘post provisioning norms’25F
26? And how could the problem be rectified? 
The production functions discussed in section 2 indicated that reducing class size from around 
55  to  33  had  a  significant  positive  impact  on  pupil  performance  more  or  less  equal  to 
switching from a non-confident teacher to a confident one. There is thus some empirical 
evidence of an effect, though the change would need to be a large, and potentially very costly 
one.  But  common  sense  should  also  play  a  role  here.  Classrooms  are  not  built  to 
accommodate  50  or  60  pupils,  so  there  are  thresholds  beyond  which  serious  problems 
undoubtedly exist. It is possible that the production function analysis, and the input-output 
data we have, are not able to identify the impact of these thresholds on pupil performance. 
We undertook some analysis of Annual Survey of Schools data to explore the causes behind 
very large classes. These data include variables on classes per grade, privately paid educators, 
multi-grade teaching and classroom availability, and are thus well suited for this purpose. All 
pupils divided by all publicly employed educators was found to be 33.6 (this is the statistic 
reflected in Figure 2 above). The average for this statistic at the school level, where each 
school is weighted by the number of pupils, was found to be 35.2 (this statistic would also be 
33.6 if educators were distributed across schools in a completely equitable manner). A third 
statistic  was  calculated  for  each  school,  namely  pupils  divided  by  ‘full-time  equivalent’ 
educators, or the number of whole educators available for teaching after the management time 
of managers had been subtracted (using the official guidelines in this regard). We called this 
statistic  the  effective  school  pupil/teacher  (P/T)  ratio.  The  pupil-weighted  mean  for  this 
statistic was found to be 37.7. But it was inequitably distributed across schools. 13% of pupils 
were found to experience an effective school P/T ratio of over 1.25 times the mean (47.1) – 
however, this statistic was not as inequitably distributed as the class size statistic. Inequalities 
with respect to this effective school P/T ratio are clearly a part of the reason behind large 
classes. And behind this factor lie some problems with the allocation model (in particular it 
does  not  take into  account  management  time),  and problems  with  the  filling  of  posts,  in 
particular in rural areas.  
Turning to class sizes experienced by pupils, the average was found to be 47.2 (in other words 
somewhat higher than what was found in TIMSS and the Systemic Evaluation), with 18% of 
pupils experiencing over 1.25 times the mean, or 59.0. Class sizes were thus more inequitably 
distributed  than  the  school  P/T  ratio,  which  one  would  expect  given  within-school 
inequalities. A simulation was run to create a scenario where, firstly, all the teaching time 
available to  schools  was used  (in  line  with the  policy  guidelines)  and,  secondly,  schools 
maximised equity between pupils in the school with respect to class size. The result was a 
mean class size of 37.8, with around 6% of pupils experiencing a class size exceeding 50 
(against 30% in the actual situation). Put differently, the mean class size could be reduced 
from 47.2 to 37.8 through a different utilisation of the existing teaching time within schools, 
and the extent of very large classes (exceeding 50) could be substantially reduced. What lies 
behind this large gap between the actual situation and the simulation? The analysis found 
rather conclusively that poor time management in schools is a problem. Even if schools with 
no classroom shortages are considered, the gap between the actual and simulated situations 
remains more or less unchanged.  
The  current  reviewing  of  the  post  provisioning  policy  in  the  DoE  involves  finding  an 
appropriate balance between teaching time requirements, and class sizes. In particular, a key 
question  is  in  which  grades  the  one  teacher  one  class  criterion  should  be  applicable. 
Moreover, the policy challenge seems to be one of communicating information better. There 
is no reason why schools (and parents) should not be presented with a simulation of the 
optimal utilisation of teaching time, and a statement of what the expected maximum class size 
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in the school should be (given the staffing complement, and given the available classrooms). 
This could provide a useful benchmark. If class sizes higher than the simulated ones exist in 
the school, this would need to be justified with reference to contingencies such as unfilled 
posts, or effective management (there may be reasons why even well managed schools would 
not pursue equity in class sizes within the school).  
9  Conclusion 
The advent of democracy in South Africa brought with it an end to racial discrimination in the 
pay  scales  of  publicly  employed  teachers.  Black  teachers  experienced  substantial  pay 
increases in 1996 to close the gap between white and black teachers, and the average unit cost 
of teachers rose sharply. Subsequently, between 1996 and 2007, teacher pay rose moderately 
in real terms. However, in 2007 teachers were still at a pay disadvantage relative to other 
professionals,  whether  one  views  the  difference  in  unconditional  terms,  or  in  conditional 
terms  (using  years  of  experience,  years  of  education,  gender  and  race  as  conditioning 
variables). The pay advantage of other professionals, who earned around 1.6 times as much as 
teachers using the conditional comparison, would probably remain an advantage even if one 
took into account the favourable working hours of teachers. What is less certain, is how the 
pay comparison would fare if outputs and productivity were taken into account, given the very 
low  average  levels  of  pupil  performance  in  South  Africa  as  evidenced  in  a  number  of 
international assessment programmes. A methodology for making this kind of comparison 
appears not to exist. However, any change to the pay system to close the gap between teachers 
and other professionals would need to come with assurances that increased public spending on 
each teacher would occur in tandem with quality improvements in the schooling system. 
The 2008 OSD changes to the teacher pay system attempt to achieve this by locating most pay 
improvements in the future, and linking these improvements to evidence of acceptable levels 
of performance on the part of individual teachers. The teacher performance criteria in the 
2008 policy focus on behavioural input factors, such the teacher’s ability to prepare good 
classes. This is a logical approach. In addition, however, the policy envisages linking pay to 
pupil performance in some way. The literature on teacher incentives suggests that this is 
probably best achieved through rewarding all teachers in a school as a group, as opposed to 
individual  teachers,  and  through  an  approach  that  takes  into  account  the  socio-economic 
background of pupils.  
The 2008 changes substantially alter the age-pay slope for teachers, and make it comparable 
or better to that of other professionals, depending on the level of performance of the teacher. 
In an international comparison, South Africa moves from having one of the flattest age-pay 
slopes, to one of the steepest. This should improve the ability of the education system to 
recruit good candidates, and to retain good teachers. Importantly, the future age-pay slope is 
more favourable than the actual age-pay slope that candidates will see if they look at existing 
teachers.  This  underlines  the  importance  of  communicating  future  pay  benefits  to  youths 
considering a teaching career.  
The working hours of teachers have been a contentious policy issue. Teachers spend less time 
teaching than what the policy requires, but this policy is ambitious by international standards 
and the actual hours of teaching put in by South African teachers compares favourably against 
those in other countries. There is a need to review and clarify the policy on the working hours 
of teachers, and perhaps to arrive at requirements that are more realistic. At the same time it 
seems  reasonable  to  expect  South  African  teachers  to  put  in  more  hours  than  teachers 
elsewhere. This is because teacher pay relative to GDP per capita is high when one considers 
the country’s level of development (the same argument can be made for other professionals), 
and because there is a problem with excessive class sizes which could be solved through 
better utilisation of teacher time in certain schools. Currently, the class size experienced by 
the average pupil is well over 40, and a large proportion of pupils, perhaps 20% to 30%, 29 
 
experience classes of around 50 pupils or more. Whilst the empirical evidence on the benefits 
of reducing class sizes is not strong, one cannot ignore basic realities, such as the fact that 
classrooms were not built to accommodate class sizes of 50 or 60. It should be possible to 
reduce the percentage of pupils in classes above 50 to around 5% simply by improving the 
utilisation of the time of teachers currently employed in schools. This should not detract from 
the importance of filling posts where these are empty (and incentivising teachers to teach in 
rural  areas),  or the importance  of  increasing  the  overall  number  of teaching  posts  in  the 
system over the long run. However, until pay relative to GDP per capita drops further (the 
current trend is a downward one) it will be economically difficult to depend on growth in the 
workforce as the primary solution to the problem of excessive class sizes.     30 
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Appendix 
The first table appearing below provides details behind the summary results presented in 
Table 2. As explained above, the analysis was performed using only observations from the 
80% of pupil-weighted  schools with the lowest average test scores. The two models (for 
language and mathematics) are rather basic in the sense that variables were largely used as 
they were in the database, without, for instance, an exploration of the effect of interaction 
terms and non-linear relationships, or the construction of complex indices. This analysis does 
therefore not exhaust the potential of the 2004 Systemic Evaluation with respect to production 
function analyses.  
The 10
th and 90
th percentile values are with reference to the reduced 80% sample. See section 




Table 4: Production functions using 2004 Systemic Evaluation data 
Variable26F
27    Language  Mathematics  Comment 
  Coeff-
icients  t-stat  p10  p90  Impact  Coeff-
icients  t-stat  p10  p90  Impact   
Teacher's years of education  E            0.1077  3.84  15.000  16.000  0.63   
Teacher's professional confidence  E  1.1184  6.59  0.000  1.000  2.28             
Teacher's participation in in-service training  E  0.5129  2.78  0.000  1.000  1.05             
Teacher's access to the internet  E  7.3994  23.35  0.000  1.000  15.10  1.1656  11.30  0.000  1.000  6.86 
Only 7% of reading teachers 
and 9% of maths teachers 
had access to internet. 
Teacher's prioritisation of salary relative to other 
factors  E  -0.4793  -2.65  0.000  1.000  -0.98  -0.6405  -9.61  0.000  1.000  -3.77   
Teacher's sense of society's appreciation  E  -1.0571  -3.34  0.000  1.000  -2.16  -0.6002  -5.01  0.000  1.000  -3.53 
Only 7% of reading teachers 
and 6% of maths teachers 
had a value of zero (no 
appreciation). 
Teacher's desire to stay in the profession  E  -0.9841  -6.11  0.000  1.000  -2.01             
Average class size  P  -0.0538  -7.15  33.556  55.000  -2.36  -0.0182  -6.37  33.556  55.000  -2.29   
Teacher's use of an African language in class  E  -1.6711  -11.18  0.000  1.000  -3.41             
Teacher's use of assignments 
(language)/projects (maths)  E            0.1399  3.45  2.000  3.000  0.82   
Teacher's use of feedback 
(language)/examinations (maths)  E  -0.6337  -5.57  3.000  4.000  -1.29  -0.0980  -3.13  2.000  4.000  -1.15 
Note that using 
examinations is negatively 
associated with the maths 
score. 
Teacher is female  E  1.4471  9.50  0.000  1.000  2.95  0.4766  8.71  0.000  1.000  2.80   
School fee charged  P  0.0043  9.40  13.000  145.000  1.15  0.0016  9.34  13.000  145.000  1.21   
Existence of a library  P  2.0912  8.88  0.000  1.000  4.27  0.8720  9.04  0.000  1.000  5.13   
Learner/toilet ratio  P  -0.0145  -9.78  19.873  118.167  -2.91             
Existence of a computer  P  1.6861  9.13  0.000  1.000  3.44  0.6880  10.93  0.000  1.000  4.05   
Ability of learners to borrow library books  P            -0.4993  -6.55  0.000  1.000  -2.94   
Existence of a telephone  P  3.2150  17.47  0.000  1.000  6.56             
Existence of playground  P            0.1594  6.28  1.000  4.000  2.81   
Learner's travelling time  L  -0.0243  -6.41  15.000  60.000  -2.23             
Parent's level of education  H  0.2723  15.29  3.000  15.000  6.67  0.0763  11.71  3.000  15.000  5.39   
Availability of newspapers in the home  H  2.1103  11.29  0.000  1.000  4.31  0.5783  8.41  0.000  1.000  3.40   
Learner's socio-economic status  L  1.3454  17.45  1.557  4.209  7.28  0.3870  13.83  1.557  4.209  6.03   
Frequency of feeding scheme lunches  L  -1.5565  -25.29  1.000  4.000  -9.53  -0.3858  -17.05  1.000  4.000  -6.81   
Learner's nutritional status  L  1.7173  10.03  2.000  3.000  3.50  0.2923  4.64  2.000  3.000  1.72   
                                                       
27 Letter refers to questionnaire used: Educator; Home (parent); Learner; Principal. 35 
 
Variable26F
27    Language  Mathematics  Comment 
  Coeff-
icients  t-stat  p10  p90  Impact  Coeff-
icients  t-stat  p10  p90  Impact   
Educator and parent's home language is the 
same  EH            0.1403  2.17  0.000  1.000  0.83   
Age difference learner to class average  L  -1.7107  -29.94  -1.475  1.725  -11.17  -0.4096  -19.57  -1.475  1.725  -7.71   
Educator and learner's gender is the same  EL  1.0553  7.27  0.000  1.000  2.15  0.2332  4.38  0.000  1.000  1.37   
Intercept    18.4135  22.59       5.7001  11.11        
Standard deviation of scores (reduced dataset)  13.4177         4.6064  
R
2 for this model  0.25         0.11  
R
2 if this model is run for entire dataset  0.53         0.45  
N for this model  25897         25780  
Number of teachers in this model  778         773  
Variables excluded from the above due to low significance for  both subjects: Average teacher qualification (P); Class size Grade 6 (P); Weekly teaching time Grade 6 (P); Rate of learner 
attendance (P); Rate of teacher attendance (P); Learner/classroom ratio (P); Existence of a tuckshop (P); Existence of a principal's office (P); Existence of electricity (P); Existence of a copier (P); 
Existence of sports facilities (P); Principal’s teaching load (P); Safety in the school (P); Absence of racial conflict (D); Parent’s use of the test language (H); Learners exposure to television (L); 
Educator and learner's home language is the same; Educator and parent's home language is the same; Learner age (L); Teacher’s age (E).  





The following table provides the values used for Figure 2 and Figure 3 above. 
























1987  263,382    
 
32.8 
      1988  280,737    
 
32.2 
      1989  284,566    
 
32.1  74,067 
    1990  291,218    
 
33.2  72,616 
    1991  300,716    
 
33.6  73,343 
    1992  311,392    
 
34.0  75,952 
    1993  336,999    
 
32.9  72,594 
    1994  347,452    
 
32.6  70,464 
    1995  357,904    
 
32.8  68,077 
    1996  368,357    
 
32.4  93,945 
    1997  368,599     498,990  32.6  94,276 
    1998  368,840  382,511  515,921  32.6  94,352  133,653  4.79 
1999  354,463  367,885  532,853  33.9  95,926  135,134  4.68 
2000  353,698  368,730  549,784  32.8  96,949  139,312  4.53 
2001  352,932  369,575  549,617  32.5  97,683  135,561  4.28 
2002  348,409  375,176  525,312  33.2  97,527  135,344  4.14 
2003  343,886  380,778  535,953  34.2  100,010  138,790  4.23 
2004  351,758  386,379  544,780  33.8  104,753  145,372  4.11 
2005  354,330  393,406  556,279  33.5  105,977  159,425  4.25 
2006  345,738  384,593  543,637  34.5  106,597  160,631  3.97 
2007  363,999  404,263  572,958  33.1  107,007  165,911  3.92 
 
 
Table  6  below  provides  the  unconditional  pay  statistics  according  to  occupation,  and 
according to methodology followed. The statistics obtaining using both point and bin values 
were used for the ratios presented in Table 3 above.  37 
 
Table 6: Mean salaries of teachers and other occupations 
 
Only point values used  Point and bin values used 
 
Mean 











UWith no education criterion 
                Teachers  82,786  691  286,976  1.00  84,669  1,086  453,265  1.00 
Non-teacher educators  67,852  106  53,803  0.82  86,112  171  93,110  1.02 
Educators (both of the above)  80,428  797  340,780  0.97  84,915  1,257  546,375  1.00 
Professionals*  139,546  268  199,696  1.69  176,635  507  417,686  2.09 
Technicians and associate professionals*  80,986  20,246  24,379  0.98  97,515  1,265  794,525  1.15 
Both of the above*  98,276  806  1,265  1.19  124,777  1,771  1,212,211  1.47 
All workers*  38,825  18,432  8,433,538  0.47  50,963  23,171  11,159,930  0.60 
UOnly with post-secondary education 
                Teachers  87,184  576  235,570  1.00  87,858  924  377,034  1.00 
Non-teacher educators  96,915  50  32,584  1.11  115,135  96  62,099  1.31 
Educators (both of the above)  88,367  626  268,154  1.01  91,715  1,020  439,133  1.04 
Professionals*  182,981  155  125,418  2.10  215,830  323  295,705  2.46 
Technicians and associate professionals*  131,617  205  152,926  1.51  153,416  380  298,027  1.75 
Both of the above*  154,761  360  278,343  1.78  184,501  703  593,731  2.10 
All workers*  206,972  1,110  718,497  2.37  194,233  2,037  1,436,667  2.21 
Source: Stats SA (2008) – datasets 2006a, 2006b, 2007a and 2007b used. Note: * means educators excluded. N and weighted observations are the average 
across the four datasets. ‘Teacher’ means occupation codes 2320, 2331, 3310, and 3391. ‘Educator’ (or sum of Teachers and Non-teacher educators) means 
occupation codes 2300 to 2399 and 3300 to 3399. All salary values in the four datasets were set at September 2007 levels using Stats SA CPIX indices.  
 
   38 
 
Table 7: Conditional wage log-lin regression model results 
 
A 
Model on all 
wage earners 
B 




As for B, but 
only those with 
post-secondary 
education 
Years of education  0.10  0.27  0.31 
 
(119.9)  (23.3)  (10.9) 
Years of education (just educators/teachers)++  0.08  -0.13  -0.17 
 
(9.8)  (-8.2)  (-5.4) 
Years of education (just professionals)  0.11  -0.04  -0.11 
 
(15.7)  (-2.8)  (-3.5) 
Years of education (just TAP)  0.07  -0.07  0.04 
 
(17.9)  (-5.9)  (1.3) 
Experience (just educators/teachers)++  0.05  0.04  0.03 
 
(9.6)  (7.6)  (4.9) 
Experience squared (just educators/teachers)++  -0.0009  -0.0007  -0.0004 
 
(-7.5)  (-5.4)  (-3.0) 
Experience (just professionals)  0.05  0.06  0.06 
 
(12.1)  (14.0)  (12.4) 
Experience squared (just professionals)  -0.0012  -0.0012  -0.0011 
 
(-11.7)  (-11.6)  (-10.3) 
Experience (just TAP)  0.04  0.04  0.04 
 
(12.7)  (13.0)  (9.5) 
Experience squared (just TAP)  -0.0006  -0.0005  -0.0009 
 
(-8.7)  (-7.8)  (-7.7) 
Is coloured  0.40  0.26  0.12 
 
(43.5)  (10.6)  (3.5) 
Is Indian  0.68  0.43  0.33 
 
(44.0)  (13.6)  (8.9) 
Is white  1.01  0.46  0.25 
 
(116.2)  (28.0)  (13.1) 
Is male  0.45  0.22  0.20 
 
(80.0)  (15.8)  (12.0) 
Is teacher  -0.87  1.67  2.34 
 
(-7.2)  (7.6)  (4.8) 
Is non-teacher educator  -1.33 
   
 
(-11.0) 
    Is non-educator professional  -1.11  0.64  1.74 
 
(-10.6)  (3.4)  (3.6) 
Is non-educator TAP  -0.81  1.00  -0.55 
 
(-13.9)  (5.8)  (-1.1) 
Constant  8.62  6.80  6.42 
 
(986.0)  (41.4)  (14.7) 
N  97285  12056  6880 
R
2  0.44  0.44  0.31 
UPredicted conditional pay (assuming average characteristics) 
Teachers  107,627  91,330  85,707 
Non-teacher educators  68,318  69,290  74,434 
Educators (both of the above)  93,394  83,350  81,587 
Professionals*  129,978  144,172  154,991 
Technicians and associate professionals*  95,057  102,331  126,763 
Both of the above*  107,089  116,748  140,822 
All workers*  52,969 
   
UPay difference ratios from above 
      Teachers  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Non-teacher educators  0.63  0.76  0.87 
Educators (both of the above)  0.87  0.91  0.95 
Professionals*  1.21  1.58  1.81 
Technicians and associate professionals*  0.88  1.12  1.48 
Both of the above*  1.00  1.28  1.64 
All workers*  0.49 
    Source: Stats SA (2008) – datasets 2006a, 2006b, 2007a and 2007b used. Note: The independent variable is 
the natural log of wage, using both original point values and point values imputed using bin brackets and key 
characteristics of workers. N here represents the count of observations across all four datasets. * means 
educators excluded. Variable ++ is educator years of experience in model A, and teacher years of experience 
in models B and C. Experience is in all instances present age minus estimated age at which the worker 
completed his studies. Predicted pay uses the average characteristics (e.g. experience and race) found in all 
observations in model C, i.e. the characteristics of the average professional (or TAP) with a post-secondary 
education. TAP means technicians and associated professionals. This makes the predicted conditional pay 




Figure 12: Distribution of conditional income values by age 
 
Source: Stats SA, 2008 (March and September surveys for 2006 and 2007 used for the graph). Note: * 
means educators excluded. Only observations where workers had some post-secondary education were 
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